Math 252 -- History of Mathematics
(Old course number: 260)

Fall 1999 -- Instructor: Schechter -- MWF 12:10-1:00 room SC-1308
(Note: We will meet in room SC-1206 on the first day of classes, and in room SC-1308 thereafter.)


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Course description and syllabus (version of August 25, 1999). This course is offered by the Mathematics Department. It is a mathematics course, with some historical commentary, devoted to mathematical topics chosen for their historical interest. It is not a history course; such courses can be found only in the History Department. Prerequisites for Math 252 are completion of 170b or 175 or their equivalent and some algebra -- preferably both linear algebra and abstract algebra -- or consent of instructor.

Grades will be based on many homework exercises and a few quizzes and tests. I do not yet have a schedule of quizzes and tests or an accounting of what percentage of your grade will be taken up by each of these items. This course is somewhat experimental, so I'm making it up as I go along. However, I can tell you at least this much now:

There will be no surprise quizzes and tests; for all quizzes and tests I will give you advance warning of both the date and the subject matter. The quizzes, tests, and homework will not contain any subjective material (such as essays or posters); it will all be objective material (such as solving math problems of types that we will study in class). I have not yet decided whether there will be some quizzes on names and dates in mathematical history; if there are any such quizzes, I'll warn you of them in advance. The homework will count for a large percentage of the grade, so take your homework seriously.

Makeups for missed quizzes or tests or late homework will not be accepted without a good excuse, and (as teacher) I am the sole judge of what is a good excuse. All excuses must be submitted in writing. I will automatically accept two absences for illness; those two notes needn't be signed by anyone but yourself.

Textbook. The book that is required for the course is

David M. Burton, The History of Mathematics: An Introduction. 4th edition. WCB/McGraw-Hill. Approx. $81.
That book should be available at the school bookstore. We will only be covering parts of Burton's book, not all of it; and we will also be covering some material that is not in Burton's book. The additional material will be written by me and distributed in class. I'll be getting that material from a variety of other books. In particular, at the beginning of the semester I'll distribute some pages from the beginning of Field Theory and its Classical Problems, by C. R. Hadlock.

Topics. Burton's book is organized chronologically -- i.e., century by century. However, we will not go through the book in that order, and we will not attempt to cover all of mathematics. Instead, we will go through a few topics, and for each topic we will cover a somewhat chronological approach. This approach will entail skipping around in Burton's book and in the supplements that I will supply in class; I'll try to make it clear at all times just which pages you should be reading.

My criteria for choosing topics are similar to the criteria given in the book by Laubenbacher and Pengelley: "the importance of the [concept] as a milestone of progress and its accessibility without extensive prior preparation." Accessibility includes the requirement that the teacher should be able to find enough examples, exercises, and theorems that are nontrivial but are elementary enough to be suitable for Math 252. "Nontrivial" means that we'll probably skip things like Babylonian arithmetic.

The following list of topics is still somewhat tentative, and probably will change a bit as the semester progresses.

What is a Number?

The answers to that question have changed as the centuries have passed.

Historical topics related to calculus

I haven't yet decided how much of this we'll cover, or in what fashion. Perhaps we'll look at how Kepler's Three Laws of Planetary Motion (1596) can be explained in terms of Newton's simpler Three Laws of Motion (1687).

That discovery had tremendous cultural significance (though I don't know if we'll spend any time on it). For millenia, humans had been at the mercy of forces of nature, particularly from the heavens: too much or too little rain would destroy the crops, and the times of planting and harvest could be read from the calendar that could be read in the motions of the stars. Nature sometimes seemed cruel and arbitrary, but Kepler's Laws showed God to be a geometer, and Newton's Laws showed that even the complicated laws of the universe follow from simple ones. This discovery was a major contributing factor in the start of the so-called Age of Enlightenment, an age in which philosophers (Voltaire, Rousseau, Jefferson, etc.) began to believe that the universe is not chaotic and arbitrary, and that humans can come to understand it and -- to an increasing degree -- control it. Thus, Newton's calculus may have contributed to a world-view that made possible democracy, the steam engine, and the industrial revolution.

Perhaps we'll also spend a few days looking at the Henstock integral. It's only an accident of history that college students nowadays learn the Riemann integral (1880's) rather than the Henstock integral (1950's). The Henstock integral is much more powerful, and its definition is only slightly more complicated.

Geometry

I haven't yet decided how much of this we'll cover, or in what fashion. However, we'll certainly cover some of Euclidean geometry and some of non-Euclidean geometry. The treatment of non-Euclidean geometry will include some brief excerpts from Katz's book, which includes many formulas for non-Euclidean trigonometry, but I think Burton's book (sections 11.1 and 11.2) gives a more readable introduction to the subject. Perhaps we'll also look at the early (Greek) notions of area and volume. By the way, here is a link to an interesting website about non-Euclidean geometry.

Non-Euclidean geometry is not just a dead and unchanging part of mathematical history. New discoveries are still being made in this branch of mathematics. Perhaps even more exciting, new discoveries in astronomy give new significance to non-Euclidean geometry. Astronomers soon hope to have observations and measurements accurate enough to decide what kind of curvature our physical universe has -- a question raised centuries ago, by Gauss. Also, is the universe finite or infinite? Also, physicists soon hope to decide how many dimensions our universe has. (It's a lot more than 3.) An article about the shape of the universe appeared in the December 1998 issue of the Notices of the AMS. And here are a few more links about the shape of the universe: a b c d e f g h i j k l

In 1868 Beltrami showed that hyperbolic geometry can be modeled within Euclidean geometry, thus proving that if the axioms of Euclidean geometry are consistent, then the axioms of hyperbolic geometry are consistent. Thus, geometry was the first branch of mathematics in which the modern role of axioms became clear. It served as an example a few decades later, when mathematicians began to axiomatize set theory.

Infinity, Set Theory, Logic, Constructivism

Burton sections 12.2 and 12.3, possibly supplemented by other materials.

In mathematics, the Age of Enlightenment may have reached its highest point in Hilbert's plan (stated most clearly in the 1920's) to unify all of mathematics on a firm foundation of logic and set theory. But Hilbert's program turned out to be unfeasible --- around 1930 mathematician Gödel and physicist Heisenberg demonstrated that some uncertainty is unavoidable. (The rise and fall of certainty is traced particularly well in a history book by Kline.) It is ironic that Gödel, himself a Platonist, may have done more than anyone else to weaken the Platonist view of mathematics. Gödel strengthened the Formalist view -- i.e., that what really exists is not the collection of mathematical objects, but rather the language that mathematicians build and use to describe those objects. The Formalist view is not entirely satisfactory -- e.g., it suggests that mathematical truth is somehow subjective; it does not explain the certainty that mathematicians still usually feel about their results. At present, there does not seem to be a satisfactory philosophy of mathematics, though some philosophers and mathematicians are still searching for one.

Mathematics has gradually become less controversial, over the centuries, as mathematicians have gained a clearer understanding of what constitutes a proof. Today there is very little room for opinion about the truthfulness or "legitimacy" of anything in mathematics; mathematicians are in full agreement about it. Probably the last great controversy or disagreement in mathematics was that over constructive versus nonconstructive mathematics. I think the controversy ended when the language of mathematics evolved enough to permit the two viewpoints to coexist; but I think that was around 1930, when Gödel proved that the Axiom of Choice was consistent with the rest of set theory. If time permits, we may also look at earlier instances of the controversy over constructivism and similar issues, and the interesting biographies of Cantor and Brouwer.

Other topics

If we have any time left over after those topics, we might continue with these: